The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled against Nigeria on the disputed Bakassi (Backassey) Peninsula and parts of Lake Chad territory with Cameroun on 10 October 2002, and Nigerian government has complied to a large extent. Ordinarily, the case has been foreclosed from further discussion. But, like any other human judgment, it has created its own problem bordering on security and integration of West African sub region and Africa. The paper argues that this has necessitated the opening of two "windows" for revisiting the case, i.e., conducting a referendum, and consideration of additional 5 colonial/post-colonial treaties earlier ignored. The fear here is that France may block reopening the case in the Security Council by relying on the doctrine of "peace at all cost". Notwithstanding, the study argues that there is merit in re-opening the case. The study adopts the "doctrine of collective security and peaceful settlement" framework, and applies secondary data collection method. The method was complemented by interviews of the affected indigenous communities and stakeholders; and finds that ICJ is not the appropriate forum to resolve such a political issue. It then recommends a diplomatic-negotiation paradigm to prevent an imminent Nigeria and Cameroun war 1
INTRODUCTION
The Bakassi (Backassey) Peninsula (BP) that is 1,000 kilometres long is rich in oil mineral, and a strategic military base. It is situated between Nigeria and Cameroun (Kamarun). Cameroun was a German colony until formally removed from Germany and made a League of Nations mandate territory at the end of World War I and administered jointly by Britain and France. Britain administered Western and Southern Cameroun from Nigeria since these parts shared a boundary with Eastern Nigeria. Incidentally, Bakassi Peninsula is situated at the southern end of the boundary. French, on the other hand, administered the Eastern part of Cameroun. By this arrangement, France never had any connection with Britain over the Bakassi Peninsula.
The border between Nigeria and Cameroun extends from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea, including offshore areas of Bakassi Peninsula that was thought to possess no particular value. Thus, the Bakassi Peninsula was for several decades not an issue to Nigeria and Cameroun; and as such the two countries signed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Declaration on Border Disputes among African states in Cairo, Egypt, in 1964. The essence of the Declaration was to forestall ethnic and/or national fragmentation in post-colonial African countries. Be that as it may, African countries continue to call on the international judicial institutions like ICJ to mediate on Email: etekpe@yahoo.com / etekpe@gmail.com. contemporary border disputes, including the Bakassi Peninsula.
Nigeria has favoured a diplomatic solution that would address the arbitrary nature of pre-colonial and colonial boundaries. This is important because, the NigeriaCameroun border is the longest, i.e., 1,680 kilometres, of all Nigeria's international boundaries and is the most complicated topography. Cameroun, on the other hand, pursued a legal solution that hinges on sustaining the inviolability of Africa's frontiers (Ikome, 2004) . According to Bekker (2003) , "the different positions made the Nigerian-Camerounian relationship to be characterized by mutual distrust and friction emanating from the claims by both countries to the disputed Bakassi Peninsual…" This resulted in 'limited clashes ' in 1981 , 1983 and 1994 (Aja, 2002 and Klare, 2004 .
On 29 March and 6 June 1994, Cameroun, supported by the French government then instituted legal action against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague "over her claim to the Bakassi Peninsula (BP) and parts of Lake Chad..; and also demanded payment of compensation for the period Nigeria occupied the areas" (MacOgonor, 2002) . Nigeria filed objections on 17 December 1995. The problem arose from the application and/or interpretation of colonial treaties especially the maritime boundaries (Table 1) , and how the ICJ relied on two (those of 1913 and 1931 , out of the 8 valid treaties) to rule in favour of Cameroun on 8 October 2002 (Pakenham, 1991 and Baye, 2011) . This means, the ruling that is a solution to Cameroun and French governments would lead to a new set of threat to the peace and integration of West African sub-region and Africa and has to be revisited (Onah, 2004:7) . Already, there is also a growing resentment in Nigeria, and concerted pressure of the Nigerian Parliament on the federal government to explore the option of referendum where the indigenous communities in the affected parts of Lake Chad and Bakassi Peninsula will play decisive role as was the cases in sudden in 2012.
This paper, re-examines the ICJ ruling and its implications on sub-regional and regional peace and integration, and argues for re-opening the case for a referendum and consideration of 5 additional treaties, 1842, 1847, 1881, 1884 and 1961 (Table 1) to bring about equity. It is divided into five parts, beginning with this introduction; followed by a brief overview of the background and problem, theoretical and methodological issues; analysis of the judgment, from the Camerounian, Nigerian and indigenous communities' perspectives; conclusion and suggestions.
Brief Background and the Problem
Formal British-Efik relations at Old Calabar started in 1841 with the signing of the anti-slavery treaty. This was followed by additional treaties in 1842 and 1881 that gave Etekpe 287 Britain the right to intervene with force if the anti-slavery treaty was violated in Old Calabar; and annexation of Efik territory to preclude French interference. Thus, Britain had an overriding influence in the area, including Bakassi (Backassey) peninsula up to the time of the Berlin Conference in 1884 (Table 1) . At the Berlin Conference, German acquired the Eastern part of Cameroun, leaving the Western and Southern parts for Britain. On 11 March 1913, Britain and Germany signed a treaty (agreement) to cover the sovereignty of Bakassi Peninsula. The treaty defined the land and maritime boundary at the Rio Del Rey (Gooch and Temperley, 1926 (Adam, 1998) .
The Notes of 1961 recognized Rio Del Rey estuary as frontier between Nigeria and Cameroun, and there was no dispute over the ownership of Bakassi Peninsula and parts of Lake Chad. The problem arose when crude oil was discovered in the Peninsula and Cameroonians then laid claims of ownership based on the Anglo-German treaty of 1913 (Table 1) . Nigerian government challenged the claims that the 1913 treaty imprecisely and poorly demarcated the border. The misinterpretation of the treaty resulted in military hostilities in 1981, 1983, 1994 and Cameroun has to file a case against Nigeria's sovereignty over the peninsula and parts of Lake Chad at the ICJ in The Hague on 29 March 1994. Cameroun requested the Court to determine the maritime frontier between the two countries under Article 31(2) of the Statute of ICJ (Bekker, 2003) . Cameroun equally alleged that Nigerian troops were occupying several areas of the Peninsula, thereby violating the fundamental principles of respect for frontiers inherited from colonial masters. Cameroun supported its claims with the British-German treaty of 11 (Kalama, 2007) .
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
The theoretical framework adopted for this study is the "doctrine of collective security and peaceful settlement" promoted by the United Nations, as well as regional and sub-regional organisations (Pius and Ndoh, 1998) in Africa, namely, African Union (AU/OAU) and Economic Community of West African States (Obinazie, 1998 , ECOWAS) (Consultative Act of AU, 2002, and Etekpe, 2010:51-62) . Incidentally, Nigeria and Cameroun are members of these organisations and signatories to declarations on border disputes among African states. The doctrine "seek to confront would-be aggressors with the concerted power of states determined to keep peace" (Wolfers, 1959: 41-70, and Wainhouse, 1966: 278-290) . The essence of the doctrine is to prevent war through the application of non-coercive and/or non-violent procedures. "In spite of its utility", Palmer and Perkins (2004: 238) wrote, "the machinery of collective security has not been satisfactorily developed". The framework is part of Article 1 of the UN Charter that calls for "effective collective measures (machineries) for prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression for acts of aggression or breach of peace." The Charter then established the Security Council, and ICJ to implement it. In supporting the framework, the then UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie reported to the General Assembly in 1951 that: and, in times settling the great political conflicts that must endanger world peace today (Wolfers, 1959) .
I believe that the development of a strong and effective UN collective security system combined with renewed efforts at mediation and conciliation can improve the chances of ameliorating
As earlier stated, in an effort to popularise the doctrine, the UN obliged the regional and sub-regional organisations, that is, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Arab League, AU (OAU) and ECOWAS to incorporate it (that is, collective security and peaceful settlement) into their respective charters (Imobighe, 2003) . The Charter of AU was then strengthened to "enhance efficiency and effectiveness of the organisation in addressing the challenges of a changing region and sub-region" on 9 July 2002 (Consultative Act of AU, 2002). It then established the mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution (CPMR) to promote peace, unity and integration. ECOWAS was equally patterned towards AU with a clear mandate to intervene in conflicts within the sub-region. The methodology applied in this study is based on secondary sources, and the paper examined the ICJ ruling, alongside the characters of judges of the Court (Table 2 ) and witnesses (Table 3) , as well as the 8 relevant pre-colonial and colonial treaties ( The emphasis on existing friendly treaties is important because it is a powerful weapon to oblige Britain to support Nigeria as crown witness at the ICJ…. the same way France is supporting Cameroun based on their defence pact. But the Nigerian government relied too much on the expertise of Bola Ajibola and Richard Akinjide to whittle down French influence in the case (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2012 ). France's interest in the case cannot be overstated. Oduntan (2006) was particular of the "French connection". He, as earlier pointed out, emphasized the fact that France has a judge and the deputy registrar of the Court. In addition, it is a member of EU, which has senior staff working in ICJ. The Nigerians perceived that the judge and deputy registrar influenced the judgement to favour Cameroun. This is not the first time France has worked against Nigeria. It started by supporting the Biafran secessionists in 1967. In 1977, France blocked Nigeria's bid to secure a seat in the UN Security Council (Adam, 1998 (2002) wrote, "its Gaullist penchant for intervening militarily in intra-African disputes is a matter of very grave concern for Nigeria". The concern, indeed, took another dimension in 1994 when France supported Cameroun to challenge Nigeria's ownership of and authority over the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad at the ICJ (Omoigui, http://www.omoigui. com).
As earlier stated, Table 2 shows France's alleged influence in the ICJ ruling as it has both a judge and deputy registrar. In addition, Ambassador Gerard Araud, President of UN Secretary Council that oversees the activities and enforces the judgement of ICJ is a French national .
An Analysis of the ICJ Judgment

The Background
The ICJ was established in The Hague as an organ of the UN in 1946. The Court settles disputes submitted to it by states by "virtue of a jurisdictional clause, i.e., typically when they are parties to an existing treaty, reciprocal effects of declarations made by parties under the statutes whereby each has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory in the event of a dispute with another state having made a similar declaration, and advisory opinions on legal questions…." (Kalama, 2007) . Between 1946 and 1997, the Court handled 41 contentious cases and delivered 21 advisory opinions. The court adopts both English and French as official languages; its judgment is final and enforceable by the UN Security Council. The Court has 15 judges elected to serve for a period of 9 years (Table  2) . Although the judges are independent magistrates and do not represent their countries there is no clause that stops them from having moral obligation to their countries (Hudson, 1943; and Palmer and Perkins, 2004) .
The Camerounian 15-member delegation to the ICJ was supported by the French government (Table 3) . It backed the cas with maps. As earlier emphasized, France has both a judge and the deputy registrar in the Court. Presumably, this was the reason why Camerounians were no longer in the mood of African integration that existed in the past by not allowing African Union to resolve the dispute through diplomatic means, instead of ICJ to secure judgement. This shows that Cameroun had prepared for it for some time.
The maps are; 
.), Garoua (NC-33/34-SO), and Maroua (NC-33/34-NO).
The Camerounian Position
Cameroun traced the genesis of the dispute to 11 March 1913 when Britain and Germany signed two agreements, namely: the settlement of the frontier between Nigeria and the Camerouns (Kamerun) -covering Yola, Nigeria to the sea; and the regulation of navigation on the Cross river (BFSP, 1913:782-7) . The agreements addressed the precise demarcation of the Anglo-German boundary between Nigeria and Cameroun (Kamerun) from Yola to the Cross river, and were accompanied by 5 maps.
1 The Germans that were by hen controlling Bakassi Peninsula (BP) conceded the 'navigable portion' of its (i.e., offshore border) to Britain for uninterrupted and secure sea lane to Calabar. In exchange, Britain conceded the BP proper to Germany. What this meant was that Germans will no longer threaten Britain of access to Calabar, and the Obong of Calabar, Nigeria did not protest. The British and Germans maps were said to clearly show BP in Cameroun, and remained so even at the time of Nigeria's amalgamation in 1914 (Omoigui,http:// www.omoigui.com).
At the end of World War I, all the German territories were divided between France and Britain by the Treaty of Versailles in 1916; and on 10 July 1919, the Franco-British Declaration defined the boundary between French and British mandated Cameroun (Bekker, 2003 Going forward, on 13 December 1946 (that is, after WW II), the United Nations (UN) placed Cameroun under Trusteeship agreement. The agreement re-ratified the proper borders as codified by the previous Anglo-German and Anglo-French agreements. Again, it was accom-panied by the same maps where BP was in Cameroun, not Nigeria.
In 1954, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies issued a 'legal order' -defining the border between Nigeria's Eastern region and Southern Camerouns, and placed the BP in the Southern Camerouns (Ikome, 2004) . By this, BP was distinct from the Eastern region and Calabar Province. On 11-12 February 1961, the UN asked Britain to clarify the position of the Northern and Southern Camerouns living in Nigeria through a plebiscite. The result of the clarification (plebiscite) showed that while the Northern Camerouns decided to remain in Nigeria, the Southern Camerouns opted to join their counterparts in Nigeria. It was emphasized that there were 21 polling stations in BP and 73 percent of the people voted to join the Republic of Cameroun (UN Resolution 1608 (XV), 1961).
In January 1962, the post-independence Nigerian government under Tafawa Balewa exchanged diplomatic notes with Cameroun where he acknowledged the fact that BP was not Nigerian territory (Anene, 1970 (Anene, 1970) . He questioned 'all the domestic and foreign policy decisions' of his predecessors, including the offshore maritime border with Cameroun. In an effort to discredit Gowon, he 'accused him (Gowon) for giving away BP to Cameroun'. Muhammed then renegated on Gowon's agreements with Ahidjo but never protested that Nigerian official maps still showed BP in Cameroun. Ibrahim Babangida, Nigeria's 5 th HOSG, saw it as an 'error' and ordered reprint of Nigerian maps to include BP in Nigeria in 1991.
Following Babangida's action, General Sani Abacha, Nigeria's 6 th HOSG, created an administrative structure, known as Bakassi Local Government Council, as part of Cross River state, Nigeria and claimed full control of the Peninsula. This action led to sporadic clashes between the two countries until the ICJ at The Hague confirmed on 10 October 2002 what Elias had stated in 1970. The ICJ reiterated the relevance of pre-colonial and colonial treaties /agreements that placed BP and some parts of Lake Chad inside Cameroun. The ruling also provided guidelines for the final clarification of the offshore borders that placed BP and 33 villages at Lake Chad inside Cameroun (Baye, 2011) .
The Nigerian Position
Nigeria recalled that Cameroun was a German colony until treaty of Versailles after the World War I. France was by then nowhere near the Bakassi Peninsula and could not have entered into treaty obligation with either Britain or the Efiks in 1913. It was after WW I 2) Adopted the delimitation method advocated.
5) Pursuant to Yaounde II and Maroua declarations of 1971 and 1975, the maritime boundary from the mouth of Akwayefe to the Sea (to the advantage of Cameroun) was fixed.
3) Nigeria under an obligation to expeditiously and without condition withdraw its administration, military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad falling within the sovereignty of Cameroun.
6) Cameroun under an obligation to expeditiously and without condition withdraw its administration, military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad falling within the sovereignty of Nigeria 7) Cameroun to continue to be faithful to its traditional policy of hospitality, tolerance and protection of Nigerians living in the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad areas. when France "acquired" the Eastern part of Cameroun, and still never had any connection with Britain over Bakassi Peninsula. France came in after Nigeria's independence when Camerounians opted to join their brothers in the French-speaking part. It is, therefore, difficult to understand how the 1913 treaty became a major prima facie evidence.
Whereas the Western capitalist world ensures that the ICJ judgement be enforced, such enforcement are often times partial. The Nigeria position is that in the case of Israelin-Palestiane conflicts, the then President of the court, Shijiu Yong ruled on 10 July 2004 that Israel should pull down the 600 kilometres of illegal barriers at the West Bank that imposed undue hardship on the Palestinians. But the United States disagreed with the judgement and the UN Security Council did not enforce it. As Oloja (2004:10) puts it, "the United States White House Spokesman, Scott Miccellen, reacted that, we do not believe that this (ruling on Israeli pulling out) is the appropriate forum to resolve what a political issue is. This is an issue that should be resolved through the process that has been put in place, specifically, the road map"
Israel equally disregarded the ruling, and yet, the UN Security Council did not enforce it. Israel looked to US veto in the Security Council to block any bid for punishment. The other example was the apartheid South Africa that ignored ICJ ruling against its illegal occupation of the then Southwest Africa (now Namibia) in 1971 as it looked to Britain to veto UN Security Council's enforcement. Adam (1998) describes such incon-sistencies in great deal in his book, United Nations, Divided World, and cautioned against the developed world's management of the post-cold war era and global peace. The caution is important in view of the far-reaching results / implications of the ICJ ruling on Nigeria-Cameroun boundary dispute on Nigeria as presented in Table 4 . Table 4 shows how the Court drew a fresh boundary between Nigeria and Cameroun in Lake Chad where Nigeria ceded 33 villages in Borno State to Cameroun.
The Nigerian position is that the case be re-opened as it ignored the inputs of indigenous communities in the affected areas, as well as 5 other relevant treaties on the matter on Bakassi Peninsula is an example of the artificial and arbitrary nature of Africa's colonially inherited boundaries. Thus, ICJ ought not to have unduly relied on the 1913 treaty as the basis of ruling in favour of Cameroun. It, therefore rejected the ruling and calls for a referendum and consideration of the 5 additional treaties.
The Indigenous Communities' Position
The position of the Bakassi returnees and indigenes of the 33 villages (with a population of about 60,000) at Lake Chad that were ceded to Cameroun have frown at the ICJ ruling, and demanding for a referendum in which they would be the deciding factor as it was done in the past, including the recent case in Southern Sudan in 2012 (Pratt, 2006) . For them, their demand for a referendum is in line with both the USA position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (earlier highlighted) where the Americans stated that ICJ 'is not the appropriate forum to resolve what is a political issue'. They asserted that the dispute over Bakassi Peninsula is also a political issue, and should be resolved by referendum. The people, urge the Nigerian government to re-open the case even though they expressed fear that France may block the Nigerian effort now that Ambassador Genrard Araud of France is the President of the UN 15-member Security Council. This is where Britain has to come in through treaty obligations (Crowe, 1907, and Gooch and Temperlety, 1926: 402-420 ) the same way France is 'dragged' in by Cameroun through their Defence Pact.
The people, however blamed the Nigerian team ( Table 3 ) that was not well composed. It never had any treaty mandatory like Harold Dappa-Biriye, Obong of Calabar, General Dr Yakubu Gowon or experienced traditional rulers privy to the colonial treaties that had hindsight to the ambiguous clauses in the 1913 treaty that formed the basis of the ruling.
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of the study are presented at Table 4 . On Bakassi Peninsula, the ICJ accepted Cameroun claims that the "imprecise and poorly demarcated border" fixed by the colonial treaties of 1913 and 1931, and rejected Nigeria's position on "historical consolidation and affectivities". On Lake Chad, it fixed the maritime boundary from the mouth of Akwayefe to the sea to the advantage of Cameroun; and obliged Nigeria to "expeditiously and without condition" with draw its presence. By this ruling, Nigeria ceded 33 villages with a total population of about 60,000 in Lake Chad territory to Cameroun. The other result is that Cameroun secured sovereignty over Bakassi Peninsula and acquired 33 villager in Lake Chad territory.
The other result bothers on the ambiguous clauses in the 1913 treaty that formed the basis of ICJ's ruling. In October 1970, a Joint Committee of experts from Nigeria and Cameroun met in Lagos, Nigeria on the Bakassi Penisula. The meeting did not agree on a precise definition of the "navigable channel" of the Akwayefe river upto where it joins the Calabar estuary as there was no Admiralty map that expressly delineated the navigable channel of the Akwayafe (Omoigui, 2012 By the ICJ verdict, Nigeria has lost entrance to the Calabar port to Cameroun. This is because the entrance to the Calabar port lies in the Calabar channel that now belongs to Cameroun. The effect of this is the danger placed on the multibillion dollar Export Processing Zone (EPZ). This is because the Calabar EPZ depends largely on the import-export activities of companies operating in the zone, and Nigeria will have to pay charges. Pratt (2006) has identified the security or strategic implications for the Nigerian state. The victory of Cameroun has made Nigeria lose its eastern access to the Atlantic Ocean. This implies that without Cameroun's approval, Nigeria's naval ships cannot move freely to Southern Africa. The social implication of the ruling are equally weighty as Nigerians, who have lived in Bakassi and the 33 villages in Lake Chad area all their lives will now face the reality of relocating as displaced persons to new environments in Cross River, Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa states. Most of them had their businesses located there and now detached from their source of income.
For Cameroun, the judgement is not only a boost to President Biya's government but it assured them of the importance of UN in handling international issues. The only problem left now is for Camerounian government to integrate the people of Bakassi into the system and work hard to bring about sustainable development.
The results and implications of the study clearly demonstrates that ICJ judgement has not "actually removed the threat to peace" in the sub-region, and as such the case should be re-opened for two reasons. i) Consideration of Additional Treaties. As previously stated, two treaties i.e. 1913 and 1931 are insufficient to form the basis for ruling in favour of Cameroun in the dispute. Nigeria should, therefore, persuade the ICJ to consider the entire 8 colonial treaties on the disputed territories (Table 1) as there is no clear reason why ICJ refused to recognise, especially, the treaties of 1842, 1847, 1881,1884 and 1961 that fixed the territorial boundary at Rio Del Rey. ii) Referendum. The ruling did not also take into account the affectivities, settlement pattern, and input of the indigenous communities living in the Peninsula and Lake Chad areas. The position of the native people in matters of international boundary dispute usually ranks uppermost as in the recent case of Southern Sudan in 2012. Thus, there should be a referendum in which they would be the deciding factor. The demand for referendum is in line with both the USA position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and international best practice.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS
The ICJ ruling on the Bakassi Peninsula and parts of Lake Chad has remained sour points in Franco-Nigerian, as well as Nigeria-Cameroun relations. This means, the judgment of ICJ on 10 October 2002 will, contrary to Camerounian and French expectations, not contribute to the final solution of the problem. As Mattick (2004) puts it, "the resolution of any problem creates a new problem", and until equity is brought into the case, it will not "remove" the UN Security Council's expected "threat to peace" in the sub-region and Africa. Accordingly, the ruling remains a keg of gunpowder in the wheel of peace and socio-economic integration in Africa. The paper foresees Nigeria challenging the ICJ's judgment by persuading the Court to consider additional 5 treaties, and conduct a referendum. This would be stiffly opposed by France, and the paper has suggested strategies to impress it on Britain to checkmate French territorial ambition in West Africa and Africa. The true test of regional peace and integration is in the bowel of time as Nigeria and Cameroun are already locked in a war of words over the Bakassi (Backassey) Peninsula and parts of Lake Chad.
The paper wish to suggest that : 1) the Nigerian government "insist" on conducting a referendum; and 2) there should be a retrial of the case by considering 5additional pre-colonial and colonial treaties that were previously ignored.
